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SYMPOSIUM

INTRODUCTION: ADMINISTRATIVE LAWMAKING
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski*
It is always hard to map a river while sailing midstream, but the current
state of administrative law is particularly resistant to neat tracing. Until the
past few years, administrative law and scholarship was marked by pragmatic
compromise: judicial deference on questions of law1 (but not too much and
not all the time)2 and freedom for agencies on questions of politics and policy3 (but not to an unseemly degree).4 There was disagreement around the
edges—and some voices in the wilderness calling for radical change—but
they operated within a shared framework of admittedly unstated, and perhaps conflicting, assumptions about the administrative state and the rule of
law.
Today, there is a sense that this pragmatic consensus is becoming unstable. Critics of the administrative state and its constitutional legitimacy seek a
return to an original settlement of limited, separated powers.5 At the other
end of the spectrum, scholars who applaud lawyers’ retreat from interfering
with administrative governance call for a more complete abnegation.6 In
between these poles lies uncertainty or fresh attempts to bolster a center that
threatens no longer to hold. With so much in administrative law and theory
up for grabs, the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium “Administrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century” could not be timelier.
© 2018 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
3 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
4 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
6 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016).
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Judicial deference to agency legal interpretations has long been a focus
of administrative law and scholarship, but discussion of this topic has intensified in recent years. Critics in the judiciary and the academy alike have questioned the validity of longstanding deference doctrines,7 while others have
rallied to their defense.8 In this Symposium, Mila Sohoni addresses the question of whether courts should withhold deference from “major questions” of
statutory interpretation.9 This doctrine had a supporting role in the blockbuster Affordable Care Act decision King v. Burwell, raising questions about
whether the decision portended future narrowing of Chevron deference.10
Professor Sohoni contends that the best reading of King limits the decision to
its particular context, namely where the interpretation of an unclear statute
authorizes substantial, widespread spending by the federal government.
Sohoni cautions that lower courts should not read King as undermining Chevron deference more broadly.
Turning from deference theory to judicial practice, Kent Barnett and
Chris Walker continue their groundbreaking empirical work on federal
courts of appeals’ application of Chevron doctrine.11 In these pages, Professors Barnett and Walker explore federal appellate courts’ approach to “Step
Two” of Chevron doctrine, which inquires whether an agency’s interpretation
of an unclear statute is reasonable.12 Their study demonstrates that agencies
win an astounding percentage of cases once they get to Step Two. Furthermore, Barnett and Walker have discovered that courts of appeals’ approaches
to Step Two are more likely to resemble purposivist statutory interpretation
or the application of arbitrary-and-capricious review, as opposed to a strongly
textualist inquiry.
Moving beyond Chevron’s domain, the Symposium’s contributions focus
on the constitutional structure of the administrative state. Kristin Hickman’s
article examines three recent separation-of-powers cases in which reviewing
courts invalidate legislative schemes that insulate agency actors from presidential control, but offer a remedy that merely tweaks the statutory arrangement to render it lawful.13 These decisions, Professor Hickman contends,
7 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016) (criticizing
Chevron deference).
8 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 297 (2017) (defending deference to agency interpretation of regulations).
9 Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419 (2018).
10 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
11 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2017) (introducing their study).
12 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1441 (2018).
13 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010);
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en
banc granted 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL401.txt

unknown

Seq: 3

30-MAY-18

14:32

2018]a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w m a k i n g i n t h e t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y1417

are consonant with American legal and political culture’s commitments to
formal separation of powers and judicial independence, yet the cases’ narrow
remedies do little to promote those values. She is not sure, however, that any
better options are in the offing.14
Drilling down on a particular problem along these lines, Aditya Bamzai
explores an important, emerging question on who counts as an “officer”
under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.15 Recently, scholars have
been grappling with the implications of the practice in the early republic of
appointing government officials with the title of “deputy.” To shed light on
this question, Professor Bamzai analyzes the opinions of five early Attorneys
General and concludes that their understanding of whether a deputy was an
“officer” for Appointments Clause purposes tracks the traditional, functional
understanding of officer status.
Perhaps the most hotly contested separation-of-powers questions in
recent years revolve around the proper scope of executive discretion to
enforce the laws and implement policy. Three contributions to the Symposium focus on that important topic. Aaron Nielson offers the results of his
empirical study about agency decisions about whether or not to enforce the
law.16 Drawing on survey data and interviews with officers from nine agencies, Professor Nielson explains the heterogeneity of agency policy and procedure in this area, offers a taxonomy to make sense of the variegated results,
and offers suggestions to improve agency practice and safeguard against
arbitrariness.
Urska Velikonja continues the theme of empirical investigation with her
contribution on the shifting enforcement policies at the Securities and
Exchange Commission.17 Professor Velikonja identifies a pullback in
enforcement efforts in recent years, which she finds worrisome, particularly
because the Commission has not publicly explained or justified its shift in
enforcement policy. Velikonja offers suggestions that could ameliorate the
problem, or at least improve our understanding of its scope.
Adam White’s work shifts focus from agency behavior to the President’s
use of discretion. He identifies the increased practice of presidential use of
executive orders to direct agencies to adopt particular policies.18 The D.C.
Circuit has concluded that when agencies implement these orders, they are
relieved from the obligation to respond to public comments in rulemaking
proceedings.19 A consideration of more general administrative law princi14 Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1475 (2018).
15 Aditya Bamzai, The Attorney General and Early Appointments Clause Practice, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1501 (2018).
16 Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose to Enforce the Law: A Preliminary Investigation,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2018).
17 Urska Velikonja, Patterns of Nonenforcment, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1549 (2018).
18 Adam J. White, Are Executive Orders a “Trump Card” in the Rulemaking Process?, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1569 (2018).
19 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784–85 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
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ples and doctrines, White concludes, supports the D.C. Circuit’s decision.
Should this doctrine remain good law, we will likely see an increase in
rulemaking by executive order.
Finally, two contributions defend the administrative state against its new
critics. Jack Beermann argues that, in fact, these critics do not represent anything entirely new, for the administrative state is always and ever under siege
by its detractors.20 Professor Beermann insists, moreover, that this most
recent assault ought to fail. It would shift power from the political branches
to the federal courts and would undermine the government’s ability to
address challenges we face as a modern society—results that he sees are not
required by our constitutional order.
Jon Michaels then defends the professionals who operate within the
administrative state under siege. In particular, he parries the attack that a
“Deep State” of unelected mandarins is somehow undermining American
democracy by frustrating the Trump administration’s initiatives.21 Unlike
the shadowy puppet masters in Russia, Turkey, or Egypt—whose image the
phrase “Deep State” is intended to conjure—the depths of the American
bureaucracy are staffed with diverse and accountable people who lack the
means or the desire to grab the reins of power. Professor Michaels concludes
that the federal bureaucracy needs such depth—and more of it—if administrative lawmaking in the twenty-first century is to produce sound policy in
line with to our country’s constitutional commitments.
The Symposium’s contributions reflect a diverse array of jurisprudential
and methodological perspectives. They are alike, however, in their rigor,
clarity, and intellectual charity, features that will be necessary for considering
the challenges and possibilities of administrative lawmaking in the twentyfirst century.

20 Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1599 (2018).
21 Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018).

